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ABSTRACT 
Although Y2K was neither an accident nor an unanticipated challenge, the 
millennium debugging was a watershed event for crisis response, prevention, and 
management, in theory and in practice. The simultaneity, high stakes, and 
ubiquity of the crisis permanently altered the circle of players with vested 
interests in and responsibility for emergency management (EM). Unfortunately, 
for political, socio-cultural, and strategic reasons, the legacy of Y2K was 
invaluable but limited: two steps forward and one step backward. Unlike 9/11, 
the Y2K crisis was anticipated, well-defined, and limited. Nonetheless, the 
Millennium project presents a model and methods that are germane to the a 
permanent but dynamic EM regime today. Y2K provided a coherent readiness 
and response model: an active matrix of players, protocols, and procedures. This 
matrix retains value even though post 9/11 challenges are more complex and 
require more agility than Y2K issues. The article first examines this model and 
other legacies, particularly in the private sector and in political culture; then the 
author describes why features dissolved and why. The author emphasizes 
investments, learning, leadership, and commitments to systems control that 
occurred as a result of Y2K, and recommends what can reasonably be done in 
the post 9/11 era to recapture cohesiveness and regimens that worked 
successfully in the Millennium Crisis. A brief literature review is included, and 
the author suggests areas for further research, especially in the area of 




Y2K left an invaluable legacy for 
emergency management (EM) after 9/11, but 
the contribution was limited in three ways. The 
first limitation was the unique and temporal 
nature of the well-defined Millennium Crisis. 
The second was the loss of popular and 
political interest in coordinated and extensive 
disaster preparedness post-Y2K. The third was 
the dissolution of common interests after the 
Millennium; stakeholders abandoned a shared 
vision of EM, and pursued separate security 
agendas with their own timetables 
Nonetheless, the Millennium is relevant, 
both as an example of a well funded, inter-
organizational success of unprecedented 
proportions, and also because attention to 
systems integration and reciprocity 
empowered a wide circle of stakeholders.  
However limited, Y2K mandated the 
only widespread “walk-through” scenarios to 
date that simulated the expert and creative 
responses necessary after 9/11, especially in 
case of cyberterrorism or infrastructure failure. 
Although the Y2K crisis was not articulated 
with the long-term in mind and the regime was 
largely dismantled, its greatest contribution 
was probability this model: an active 
stakeholder-centered matrix of protocols, 
reviews, and procedures (Table 1). 
Information systems professionals, experts in 
other fields, and laymen accepted information 
and communication technology (ICT) 
management as their area of responsibility and 
accountability: before, during, and after the 
crisis. The matrix approach to stakeholder 
participation informed and facilitated 
cooperative alliances and synergies, and holds 
great promise for the post 9/11 era.  
Y2K was a socio-cultural, economic, 
political, and highly public event. Through 
congressional hearings, Americans learned 
that we have created systems that we do not 
understand. Through the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, business partners and 
investors learned who was and who was not 
yet Y2K-ready. A conference of experts, 
hosted by the Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, described possible ripple 
effects from the Millennium Bug, from 
subsystems through supersystems. Hours of 
expert testimony were broadcast and re-
broadcast on C-SPAN for months, and sold to 
viewers by request. 
Y2K galvanized support for short-term 
cooperation: the problem was pressing,
Table 1. Matrix for Y2K preparedness assessment for each stakeholder, with intuitive 
horizons 
 
 Reviews Protocols Procedures 
Needs Analysis    
Resources    
Outcomes (e.g. fix, replace, work around)    
Assessment ( e.g. compliance, readiness, failure)    
Subsystems (e.g. business partners)    
Supersystems (e.g. infrastructure)    
Oversight (e.g. Securities and Exchange Commission quarterly 
statements of readiness) 
   
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This paper’s research objectives are 
twofold. The first is to examine the impact 
of definition and articulation on long-term 
support for emergency management (EM) 
regimes. The second objective is to describe 
both the salient characteristics of successful 
Y2K multi-year projects, and also the major 
players or active stakeholders. The author 
proposes that the matrix model employed 
during the Millennium Crisis created 
synergies and numerous advantages that are 
germane for the post 9/11 era, especially 
these three: flexibility, robustness, and a 
high degree of self-organization. The article 
is intended for not only practitioners such as 
Chief Security Officers and academicians, 
but also policy makers who may gain 
insights from the thesis that effective EM 
models are, above all, social networks. 
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predictable, and fixable with enough 
knowledge, time, money, and cooperation. 
Pressure spread vertically and horizontally 
across organizations: large companies exerted 
pressure on small companies and customers; 
the UN and the OECD monitored the level of 
preparedness in poorer countries; a Senate 
Subcommittee ranked the readiness of U. S. 
government agencies; in the United Kingdom, 
a superb report, Realising the Benefits of Y2K, 
was presented. Y2K became a cultural icon: an 
interesting, simple problem, broadly 
communicated and discussed, segmented into 
manageable parts.  
 The interdependence of government, 
healthcare, utilities, transportation, services, 
and communications through information 
systems was perceived as self-evident and 
critical for crisis prevention, response, and 
management. Emergency preparedness and 
broad approaches to disaster and contingency 
planning were enhanced incrementally in the 
ubiquitous multi-year Y2K effort. Perhaps 
most significantly, the tacit responsibility of 
EM leaders not only for the health of their own 
organizations, but also for the general good 
marked a watershed in preparedness. A quiet 
shift in context, away from self-interest and 
intra-organizational responses, may have been 
the most seismic development in the long run. 
 The crisis was a gateway to future 
global regimes, but not a bridge. On the whole, 
the leadership, vision, and resources necessary 
to sustain systems-wide EM evaporated and, 
unfortunately, were not resurrected after 9/11. 
After few millennium problems surfaced, the 
focus on the common good, such as the 
infrastructure, waned. Ironically, if more 
failures had occurred, interest in extensive EM 
regimens may have been bolstered. The 
greatest long-term impact on crisis response 
and management was probably within the 
business sector. Although leaders and 
stakeholders lacked the vision, creativity, or 
leverage to parlay the campaign into a 
permanent inter-organizational regime, it is 
germane to search for lessons that are of EM 
after the 9/11 attacks. 
The article will examine first the multi-
year effort to correct the millennium bug and 
the circle of stakeholders. Then, the author 
will discuss the loss of political and popular 
support for EM after Y2K. The study contrasts 
Y2K and the post 9/11 era, and recommends 
what models and lessons can be utilized 
reasonably. A brief literature review precedes 
suggestions for further research. 
Y2K 
A Unique Event 
The Y2K crisis was unique: not an 
accident or an unanticipated event, and with 
global reach. The project was “largest 
coordinated worldwide activity to address a 
shared technology problem” (McDermott 1998, 
42); “the first global challenge caused by 
information technology” said the United 
Nations-sponsored International Y2K 
Cooperation Center Final Report. The price of 
the fix was unprecedented: the Gartner Group 
estimated the cost of Y2K at $600 billion, 
although that price includes upgrades to 
replace or improve legacy systems 
(McDermott 1998, 41). In ComputerWorld in 
1997, Peter Keen noted that that price tag was 
but part of the cost, and that the time- and 
people- resources devoted to Y2K were even 
more significant; that Y2K was more of a 
management problem than a technical 
challenge (Hyatt 1998, 16). Since no one knew 
just how many systems and embedded chips 
were vulnerable, Y2K forced organizations 
and individuals to perform unprecedented 
system-wide analyses and to fix or replace 
unreliable systems in a timely manner. Many 
organizations brought their ICTs and software 
under control, inventoried their information 
technology (IT), and learned about their 
dependencies on other parties, for the first time. 
Supply chains were evaluated and the 
reliability of key suppliers and customers was 
evaluated. Y2K provided an occasion for 
much needed pruning and organizing for 
systems and relationships.  
National contingency plans were 
created, tested, and altered. Governments at all 
levels attempted to understand and connect 
with public and private suppliers of critical 
services. Although organizations were often 
reluctant to share data, and government 
agencies fell short of their targeted compliance 
deadlines, the Y2K campaign was truly 
pervasive and persuasive. Robust problem 
definitions, cogent imagery, and graphic 
projections helped stakeholders to visualize 
multiple levels of investigation and 
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remediation. Although Y2K was not a security 
problem per se, but a maintenance issue, 
security planning and EM investments were 
deep and far-reaching not only within 
organizations, but also across cultures. From 
government agencies to households, users 
accepted a public responsibility for 
information systems reliability, for the 
common good. President Clinton’s Council on 
the Year 2000, a Senate Subcommittee, and 
the Government Infrastructure Protection 
Center held public hearings and press briefings, 
not only for progress reports and reassurance, 
to prevent panic and to garner support for 
sizeable EM budgets. The IT-driven 
productivity surge of the late 1990s drove the 
U.S. stock market to unprecedented heights, 
although over-investment in IT produced a 
novel but dangerous business cycle. 
Economically, Y2K readiness could not be 
assured through domestic efforts alone. 
Outsourcing gathered steam--from SAP in 
Germany to Israel to shops throughout 
Bangalore, India. Economically, IT investment 
trends from 1995 to 2000 seem to show that 
over-investment in Y2K contributed to the 
bubble in the stock market and post-2000 the 
recession. Two factors probably reduced 
employment after 2000, from services to 
manufacturing: increases in productivity 
because of IT installed during the Y2K crisis, 
as well as expanded outsourcing that 
originated with Y2K projects.  
A DEFINING EVENT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
Y2K’s resemblance to 9/11 is limited 
for several reasons. Y2K campaigns preceded 
the Millennium moment, whereas 9/11’s 
challenges followed a tragedy. Also 9/11 left 
us with much more complex and open-ended 
problems, and these require more agile 
solutions than the Y2K bug did. Yet Y2K 
enhanced best practices through inter-
organizational brainstorming in five distinct 
stages: anticipating failure points and 
preventing crisis; planning crisis responses; 
establishing contingency plans; training and 
rehearsing; and, finally, evaluating EM 
performance evaluation (Table 2). Information 
systems acumen spread across a broad range 
of players, from Chief Information Officers 
(CIOs) to congressional committees to United 
Nations’ task forces. Peter deJager intoned 
before a congressional hearing: “We have 
created systems we do not understand” 
(Yourdon and Yourdon 1998, 384), and ICT 
consumers at every level struggled to 
understand not only the systems they bought 
into, but also their vulnerability as subsystems. 
 
Table 2. Multiple impacts of Y2K 
 
Professional • an enforced deadline 
• surge in outsourcing 
• replacement of legacy systems 
• teamwork and accountability 
• humility 
Economic • $600 billion invested [Gartner Group] 
• surge in upgrade funds 
• tech stock market bubble 
• competitive advantage 
Sociocultural • consistent, dramatic newsworthiness 
• ongoing debate about risks 
• popular stake in preparedness 
• subject for humor, hype, and skepticism 
• a global event 
Political • oversight and responsibility 
• executive, SEC, legislative 
• hearings, judiciary 
• both non-profit and commercial command & control regimes 
Intellectual • unprecedented attention to ICTs 
• acknowledged dependence on overlapping systems 
• debate on the general good and IT  
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Y2K propelled stakeholders to leap into 
multi-party risk analysis, data quality control, 
and contingency planning. Moreover, the 
campaign coordinated expertise, resource 
allocations, and commitments that were truly 
global. Nationally, critical linkages extended 
the reach of Y2K projects: from government to 
transportation to communication, banking, 
military, healthcare, educational, and utilities, 
and through local restaurants, dentist’s offices, 
retailers, and libraries (Table 3).  
Because the response to Y2K was 
unprecedented and a multi-year event, the 
effort was unique not only in scope and 
investment, but also in the types of players 
involved in damage control. Government at all 
levels, banking regulators, transportation 
authorities, and local militia and health 
organizations not only joined in the 
cooperative effort, but were themselves forced 
to demonstrate Y2K readiness. Although 
special teams and committees were disbanded 
after the event, Y2K was an invaluable 
experience.  
The aggregate effects of coordinated 
attention in areas such as utilities, 
transportation, banking and finance, healthcare, 
and government were extraordinary. Y2K 
accelerated and coordinated systems 
development with multiple impacts: billions of 
dollars spent on testing; a plethora of 
outsourcing partnerships; massive investment 
in debugging and upgrading; and productivity 
increases in the short and in the long term. In 
the U.S., corporations were compelled to 
certify their compliance with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Technologically, 
the crisis accelerated systems upgrading and 
platform choices, upgraded 1997-2000 IT 
budgets for control and maintenance, 
strengthened major global software players 
and partnerships, and mandated public 
financing for the ICT infrastructure. Y2K 
accelerated the development of Application 
Service Providers and Enterprise Resource 
Planning, and paved the way for the 
emergence of Chief Security Officers (CSOs) 
to manage disaster preparedness for business 
enterprises. 
 Although few systems actually crashed 
during the millennium, and elevator 
passengers could relax their fear of embedded 
chips, Y2K mattered. Y2K’s effects were: 
intellectual, financial, technological, economic, 
socio-cultural, and, above all, educative (Table 
2). The event enlarged the criteria for sound 
information systems practice, and extended the 
arena of responsibility, accountability, and 
liability away from small circles of systems 
professionals: to manufacturers, chip designers, 
industry analysts, management at every level, 
users, socio-cultural gurus, economic analysts, 
and political leaders. From systems forensics
 
Table 3. Millennium projects: critical linkages, from prevention through emergency 
management 
 
Prevention • preparedness and oversight: 
• command & control regimes 
• documented Y2K readiness, certification, 
compliance. 
• a deadline: ease of definition 
Communication • multidirectional, dramatic, dynamic inter-
organizational cooperation & collaboration; 
• accountability, responsibility , & 
liability established 
Response • risk analysis 
• multilevel ripple effects 
• contingency planning 
• flexibility 
• informed oversight 
• massive IT investments 
Emergency Management  • multi-level 
• political & commercial leadership 
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to desktop information responsibility, the 
campaign promoted widespread understanding: 
of dependence on information systems, of 
vulnerability to attack or sabotage, of the costs 
of downtime and disruption. 
Y2K educated policy makers, the 
public at large, and business leaders about risk 
as no other event before or since. Scenarios 
were investigated and replayed across the 
world: the impacts of systems failure were 
quantified and the ripple effects fully 
described—sometimes to excess, with socio-
cultural as well as technological impacts. 
Information systems reliability was seen as a 
strategic national necessity for the first time, 
especially in advanced economies. Numerous 
programs ended after Y2K, but a prototype 
had been developed for future reference. The 
World Bank funded a United Nations-based 
International Cooperation Center that advised 
170 countries how to fix the Millennium Bug, 
and reported on the progress of Y2K 
campaigns globally. Numerous organizations 
sought and found competitive advantage 
through Y2K readiness. People’s Bank of 
Bridgeport printed handsome fliers and 
distributed buttons proclaiming: “We’re 
Getting Ready for the Year 2000”, and hosted 
conferences on readiness for local businesses 
and universities. Numerous software houses 
and hardware providers boomed because of 
Y2K One ICT guru, Peter de Jager, published 
a list of organizations that benefited most from 
Y2K contracts (McDermott 1998, 43). 
Command and control centers were set up and 
tested. All of these formal efforts were 
disbanded, but a sea change had occurred. 
Richard Clarke was appointed as a special 
advisor to President Clinton for cybersecurity 
during the Y2K crisis, and advocated a logical 
segue from Y2K to cyberterrorism. 
Particularly in view of the 9/11 Commissions 
recommendations, it is evident that Y2K’s 
probably contributed more strongly to 
collaborative enterprise development in the 
private sector, in contrast with the lack of 
integration and extension across government 
agencies, especially in the area of intelligence, 
in the early 2000s.  
EM And Popular Culture: The Y2K 
Boomerang And Backlash  
By 2000, C.P. Snow’s hypothesis 
(Snow 1959), that modern technology creates 
an unbridgeable chasm between professionals 
and laymen, seemed to have lost credence, 
given the mass market for ICTs and the vast 
publicity given to Y2K fixes. However, after 
Y2K, the public swiftly lost interest in 
readiness, and the regime imploded (Table 4). 
Perhaps, recalling Snow’s observation, both 
the content and the context of preparedness 
had not been sufficiently appreciated by 
laymen. Even though the Y2K problem was 
well defined and visualized, and inter- 
organizational collaboration was 
 
Table 4. Why Y2K readiness imploded 
 
Professional • success but embarrassment 
• collaboration and cooperation ends 
• new IT foci: ASPs, ERP 
Economic • budgets exhausted 
• IT bubble 
• competitive advantage elsewhere 
Sociocultural • loss of interest 
• Inability to imagine future vulnerability 
• sharp decline in newsworthiness 
• credibility issue: was the crisis overblown? 
Political • lack of political will, expertise & imagination 
• divorce of Y2K from issues, especially in regard to cyberterrorism 
• regimes dismantled: difficult communication 
• poor definition & problem articulation 
• separation of public & commercial priorities 
• atrophy of cooperation 
• dismantling of command & control regimes 
Intellectual • splintered & competing views of responsibility for the general good 
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unprecedented, the broader implications for 
long-term crisis management across 
organizations were not well articulated.  
The shared vision, disaster prevention 
regime, and imagery associated with Y2K did 
not survive the millennial event intact. When 
dire predictions did not come true, support for 
inter-organizational collaboration and a 
permanent IT-disaster regime evaporated. The 
quiet success of most Y2K projects created the 
perception that the problem had been 
overstated and hyped. 
On one level, Y2K was a unique and 
defining event in crisis management but, on 
another, it was a passing diversion – at times, a 
circus. The Millennium Crisis was dramatic 
and riveting because no one knew what was 
going to happen, and the imagery was 
galvanizing. On public airwaves, experts 
confessed that they had caused the mess not 
out of stupidity but for efficiency; « More 
programming sins have been committed under 
the guise of efficiency than any other reason, 
including stupidity. » (McDermott 1998, xiv ). 
Y2K bugs were compared to cancer, spreading 
silently throughout the organization (Hyatt 
1998, 3) threatening ATMs, bank accounts, 
credit ratings, prescriptions, electronic doors, 
elevators, and security systems (Hyatt 1998, 
32, passim; Spector 1999). The highly 
respected Peter Keen said, « The problem is 
far worse than even the pessimists believe. » 
(Hyatt 1998, 16). 
The population was warned: 
« Computer systems all over the world will 
begin spewing out bad data—or stop working 
altogether ! When this happens, it will be 
similar to a giant hard-disk failure. It’s 
inevitable, and it’s going to be terribly ugly 
when it happens. The only difference is that it 
is going to be a billion times worse than the 
worst microcomputer crash you have ever 
experienced or could ever imagine. » (Hyatt 
1998, 3).  
Experts and pundits compared the 
impact of Y2K to the 1929 Stock Market 
Crash, and forecast a sustained decline similar 
to the Great Depression if all bugs were not 
found: « Keep in mind that even if the Year 
2000 problems are severe…, if the company 
can’t get access to its customers or to the funds 
in its corporate bank account, it may still be 
able to limp along for a month or two until it 
closes the doors. If it can’t process orders and 
invoices properly…, it could find itself 
bleeding to death over a period of six months 
to a year » (Yourdon and Yourdon 1998, 39).   
The scope, depth, uncertainty and 
ubiquity of the Y2K problem captured the 
public imagination: on the evening news, on 
the cover of news magazines, before Congress, 
the courts, and in the Oval Office. Political 
analysts warned that President Clinton would 
be remembered for the Year 2000 Crisis the 
way Hoover was for the Great Depression. 
Since Y2K had the potential for grave damage 
to vast super systems, to elevators, to air traffic 
control, to public utilities, to security systems 
themselves, the public’s attention seldom 
wavered but the popular commitment to 
continuous EM investments was shallow. 
To many laymen, the year 2000 crisis 
was overstated: a widespread patch job 
characterized by confusion, mismanagement, 
hyperbole, and over-investment. A typical, 
alarmist readiness list may have encouraged 
skepticism (Table 5) ( Hyatt 1998, 210, 
passim).  
Hyatt added, « I would suggest 
stockpiling : ammunition (especially .22 
caliber), toilet paper. Bic lighters, coffee and 
tea, sugar. » (Hyatt 1998, 210). Buyers 
hoarded and stockpiled so much Spam before 
the Millennium that Hormel’s earnings 
plummeted in 2000 and 2001 (Different Kind 
of Canned Excuse, 2001). 
There were voices of moderation. 
McDermott reminded readers that disasters 
often benefited the economy, and he put the 
risk factor in Table 6 at a daunting (but 
accurate) 5.  
ICT gurus and public officials sought to 
reassure the public, but a chasm developed 
between EM experts and other stakeholders in 
2000 that still, to some extent, has not been 
bridged in 2004—three years after 9/11. 
What Can Be Done Post 9/11?  
Unprecedented cross-disciplinary 
teamwork, oversight, development and 
systems-wide assessment built Y2K ready 
systems and also contingency and continuity 
programs, alliances, and expertise. The 
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Table 5. “What to do” list for Y2K emergency preparedness 
 
1 Secure copies of important documents 
2 Build an emergency preparedness library 
3 Evaluate your current location 
4 Determine your self-defence philosophy …( If you are going to purchase a gun, make sure it is 
appropriate for your size and goals) 
5 Find an alternate source of water 
6 Stockpile food and common household goods 
7 Purchase adequate clothing (because the Y2K crisis will start in the middle of winter) 
8 Develop an alternate source of heat and energy if you don’t have a fireplace, you might consider 
putting in a woodburning stove 
9 Prepare an emergency medical kit 
10 Determine how you will dispose of waste 
11 Secure an alternate form of currency 
12 Acquire a basic selection of hand tools 
Table 6.”How bad is it?” chart 
 
Score Assessment 
0 It is a hoax perpetuated by vendors, consultants, and lawyers to make a lot of money 
1 It is a minor problem that can easily be fixed 
2 It is no big deal 
3 The problem should be addressed, but it is not serious 
4 It is a serous problem if not fixed, but it is well within the realm of what can be done 
5 It is a serious problem that will require hard work, but it can be fixed without disaster 
6 The problem can be fixed but will be very expensive 
7 It is a serious problem that will have huge costs and cripple some large companies 
8 The costs will be so severe as to cause major economic repercussions 
9 The problem will cause severe economic disruptions to our way of life for at least several months 
10 The problem will be the end of civilization as we know it, and we will never recover 
 
important questions raised are: What did we 
learn and what did we not learn from Y2K that 
is useful after 9/11? Who learned? What 
concrete changes and contributions can be 
attributed to Y2K, however inadvertently, and 
which opportunities may have been missed? In 
the long term, media hype obscured numerous 
collateral benefits of the Y2K crisis—such as 
unprecedented system-wide understanding of 
IT possibilities and relationships that emerged 
or were at least accelerated by massive Y2K 
investments, contingency plans, and 
stakeholder empowerment. How can the 
expertise be developed to deal with 
catastrophic threats, and to foster a learning, 
security culture?  
After 9/11, crisis prevention shifted 
away from matrix models, toward more linear 
and vertical strategies focused on intelligence 
gathering and warfare—the identification and 
destruction of hostile agents, targets, and 
weapons. Since terrorist attacks cannot be 
predicted with precision and probability, the 
scope of prevention, preparedness, and crisis 
management is unwieldy. Effective ICT 
weapons have not yet been developed and 
deployed, such as data mining, decision 
support, coordinated digital surveillance, or 
back-up and control mechanisms. Also, 
numerous non-technical, soft factors affect the 
development of these factors : language skills, 
border controls, clandestine terrorist financing, 
cultural dissonance, diplomatic expertise, 
capable political leadership, and legal 
constraints.  
Stark differences exist between the two 
crises—Y2K and 9/11, EM challenges after 
9/11 far exceed Y2K’s, and the solutions are 
more elusive (Table 7).  
In the Millennium crisis, remediation 
methods were obvious : fix, replace, work 
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around, expand, encapsulate, compress, or 
abandon (McDermott 1998, passim). It was 
easy to locate shareware patches, or tap 
expertise from offshore software houses to 
computer science majors. As noted above, 
some organizations avoided the problem 
altogether by accelerating the replacement of 
legacy systems. The responders to the 
millennium crisis were broad-based: 
government at all levels, representatives of all 
the professions, industry associations and self-
regulators, infrastructure leaders, and local 
militia and health organizations not only 
joined in the cooperative effort, but were 
themselves forced to demonstrate Y2K 
readiness. 
After 9/11, it was difficult to 
comandeer assets in the absence of a clear and 
well-defined, forecasted event. Perhaps 
because few stakeholders are included in the 
circle of active players, numerous programs 
were initiated, few direct or collateral benefits 
are apparent. Unlike Y2K, it will take years to 
develop and deploy expertise : from linguistics 
to backed-up communication systems. Unlike 
Y2k, avenues of attack and contagion are not 
restricted to ICTs, and threats are broad and 
open-ended. 
Counterterrorism, unlike Y2K projects, 
is top-down, isolated and secretive, and has 
not adopted this effective model: a broad-
based, self-organizing, flexible social network 
that breaks complex tasks down through nodes 
of individuals following simple rules 
(Bonabeau and Meyer, 2001). In fact, 
secretiveness may produce a culture of “Group 
Think” and tunnel vision—a problem 
emphasized by the 9/11 Commission.  
Fragmented and unstructured stakeholder 
responses and also divergent government-
commercial priorities make it difficult to 
coordinate and assess ongoing improvements 
in crisis prevention and management. Y2K and 
the years after 9/11 illustrate not only that the
 
Table 7. Y2K campaigns and the post- 9/11 challenge 
 
Y2K Post 9/11 
Broad, Unified Stakeholder Circle: Lay and 
Professional Top-Down and Bottom-Up Continuous 
Input and Assessment 
Fragmented Stakeholders, Often with Diverse 
Priorities 
IT-centered problems Problems not only IT-centered: Myriad Avenues of 
Attack and Contagion 
Anticipated, overt, possibly overstated threat Continuous Threat 
Well-Defined, Articulated, and Justified Isolated and secretive counterterrorism: the danger 
of Group Think” and tunnel vision 
Broadly Communicated Poorly Communicated 
Enmeshed in Popular Culture Massive, Diverse, and Ill-Defined Needs 
Temporary, A Management Challenge and a 
Technological Task 
No Specific Timetable 
Collateral Benefits of Fixes Difficult to Define 
Technological and Managerial Issues: Socio-
Cultural Impact Transitory 
Fear of Pandemic of Panic 
Empowered Leadership and Oversight More Difficult to Respond to Systemic Failures than 
to Prevent Them 
Assessment Methods and Measures Lack of Assessment, Measurement, and Collateral 
Benefits (Including Learning) 
Damage Estimates Exaggerated Ill-Defined, Difficult to Articulate, Choices Difficult 
to Prioritize 
The Advantages of Prevention: Shared Solutions 
and Containment 
Less Mutual Trust and Empowerment 
 Political Rather than Technological Issues: 
Socioeconomic Context 
 Ongoing, Perhaps Growing Threats 
 Difficult to Coordinate, Lead, Assess, or Measure 
Preventative Measures 
 Probable Cause: Deliberate Human Agents 
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public and private attention span is short but 
also that leadership’s appreciation for 
complexity and patience can be limited. 
Ideally, a balance can be achieved between 
sensationalizing a crisis and informing and 
empowering stakeholders. It appears that, if 
the size and scope of a scheduled and 
manageable challenge such as Y2K is 
communicated and understood, stakeholder 
trust and collaboration is, in fact, intuitive. A 
major lesson of YK appears to be that a crisis 
and solutions must not only be defined but 
well-articulated, and involving as many 
stakeholders as possible through appropriate 
imagery, creative problem-solving, walk-
throughs, and trust.  
To date, cyberterrorism appears to be 
the threat that most closely resembles Y2K, 
especially in the form of information 
warfare—an increasingly common form of 
attack. Through military, corporate, 
intelligence think tanks, and academic sources, 
scores of incidents of information warfare are 
documented on the website for the Institute for 
the Advanced Study of Information Warfare 
(http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html). 
Although these skirmishes in this form of 
guerrilla war may well precede « an electronic 
Pearl Harbor », some threats resemble the 
Year 2000 crisis in several areas : the danger 
to a broad range of targets, including 
infrastructures ; the unknown depth and 
breadth of the attacks ; the huge amount of 
investment not only in ICTs but in cooperative 
expertise that is required to prevent or contain 
damages ; and the need for public, educative 
forums to clearly articulate and define this 
ubiquitous problem. What is clearly different 
from Y2K, is that stakeholders do not know 
when attacks may occur or what they should 
do. In the absence of both a linear timetable 
and deadline, and also an ongoing popular 
debate focused on milestones and 
measurements, it is difficult to build upon the 
squandered legacies of Y2K. 
To date, unlike Y2K, 9/11 has neither 
educated nor mobilized stakeholders, and the 
absence of candor or reassurance may have 
eroded trust. Immediately after the Millennium, 
the cyberterrorism czar, Richard Clarke, noted 
the need for continuous preparedness - before 
cyberterrorists could emulate hackers and 
attack the infrastructure (Clarke 2000). Yet 
three years after the World Trade Center 
Disaster, Stephen Flynn’s America the 
Vulnerable describes the lack of cogent 
planning or preparedness (Flynn 2004). On 
August 14, 2004, Gabriel Wieman reported on 
CNN that Al Qaida and associated groups 
have more than 4,000 Websites, expertise with 
embedded messages using steganography, and 
their own third generation computer language 
for propaganda, training, and fund raising. In 
2004, Clarke’s Against All Enemies criticized 
Bush Administration’s handling of events both 
before and after 9/11 (Clarke 2004). The 
failure of the electrical grid in the eastern 
United States in August, 2003 illustrated the 
vulnerability of the most basic infrastructure 
services, even without a human agent. In the 
autumn of 2003, editorials asked how public 
health officials could handle a bioterrorist 
attack, if the government failed to provide 
sufficient supplies of flu vaccine (Davis 2004). 
As late as October 2004, intelligence agencies 
lacked an integrated and shareable terrorist 
watch list.  
A lack of stakeholder involvement not 
only wastes resources, but also increases fear 
and reduces credibility. For example, residents 
of New London, Connecticut have yet to be 
informed if, in the three years since 9/11, any 
plans exist to protect any or all of four 
strategic facilities clustered near the mouth of 
the Thames River: the Waterford nuclear 
power plant, the Groton submarine base, 
Electric Boat’s naval shipyard , and the Coast 
Guard Academy. Public petitions to restrict fly 
space over the power plant and the other 
facilities have been denied.  
After 9/11, in contrast to the public 
sector, some individual organizations 
developed contingency plans. For example, the 
New York Stock Exchange established 
alternate sites in Brooklyn and New Jersey. 
Morgan Stanley constructed a backup trading 
facility 35 miles from its mid-Manhattan 
headquarters, but not on the same power or 
telephone grid (CNN Money 2001) . However, 
unlike Y2K, coordinated and system-wide 
prevention, responder, and backup systems 
were not mandatory and little or no oversight 
has been established. In fact, the American 
Management Association, in annual Crisis 
Management and Security Issues surveys, 
found that fewer businesses had contigency 
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plans in 2004 than in 2003: only 61% of 
executives said that their companies had a 
crisis plan in 2004, down from 64% a year 
earlier. 54% of the companies had established 
a crisis management team in 2004, down from 
62% in 2003 (American Management 
Association 2004). 
Building upon and improving Y2K’s 
legacy, some measures could be initiated 
swiftly and simultaneously : the development 
of expertise and intelligence, infrastructural 
improvements, and coordinated stakeholder 
participation, with oversight. (Table 8) . Many 
of these strategies convey collateral benefits. 
In hindsight, the Y2K experience 
indicates that in anticipation of grave crises, 
such as a cyberterrorist attack, a matrix model 
works well that coordinates stakeholder 
activity and encourages self-organization and 
flexibility. In Swarm Intelligence, the 
efficiency and interconnectivity of social 
insects is discussed and efforts to capture the 
rules that make matrix strategies succeed are 
described (Bonabeau and Meyer 2001). 
However, matrix strategies and stakeholder 
empowerment will not work without 
distributed responsibility and top-down, as 
well as bottom-up, accountability.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A plethora of material on Y2K emerged 
from 1995 up to 2000: monographs, articles, 
congressional hearings, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s compliance 
documents, and trade publications Three 
monographs were prominent, and their titles 
are instructive: The Millennium Bug: Survive 
the Coming Chaos (Hyatt 1998), Time Bomb 
2000 (Yourdon and Yourdon 1998), and 
Solving the Year 2000 Crisis (McDermott 
1998). The author used McDermott as a 
supplementary systems analysis and design 
textbook, since his emphasis was on computer 
engineering and Y2K fixes: replace, expand, 
window, compress, work around, encapsulate, 
or abandon. In addition, he thoroughly 
investigated costing, staffing, strategies, 
failure points, and testing. In his first four 
chapters, McDermott presented not only the 
Y2K crisis, but also a balanced description of 
the context in which solutions were sought. 
The Yourdons’ Time Bomb 2000 was a 
bestseller, and described potential Y2K 
problems in numerous areas: employment, 
banking and credit, transportation, food, 
utilities, news and information, health and 
medicine, government, education, telephone 
and mail services. Also, in each chapter the 
authors included fallback advice for two-day, 
one-month, one-year, and ten-year failures or 
disruptions. Hyatt’s The Millennium Bud: How 
to Survive the Coming Chaos was both the 
most alarmist and also the most informative 
book for anecdotes and quotes that illustrate 
the fear and hype that contaminated Y2K’s 
legacy (Hyatt 1998). In addition, his footnotes 
are a gold mine for researchers looking for 
popular, trade, or obscure articles on the 
millennium bug. 
Hyatt’s book was not only a survival 
guide, but also contained estimates of the costs 
of software fixes and the potential costs of 
institutional breakdowns if there were still 
software glitches because of Y2K. 
Unfortunately, these books are dated, and of 
limited value for an assessment of the 
significance of Y2K into the millennium. 
The dominant Y2K question on January 
1, 2000 was, “Was the crisis exaggerated?” 
However, from 2000 to 2004, little research on 
the Year 2000 crisis has been conducted in 
information systems or in other disciplines. No,
 
Table 8. Using and improving Y2K’s legacy 
 
Expertise: Well-funded Training and Education 
Intelligence: Improved Predictions 
Infrastructure improvements, Including Feedback, Control, and Contingency Planning 
Continuous Top-Down Coordination, Oversight, and Assessment 




researcher investigated the collateral benefits 
unintended consequences, and new directions 
in information systems because of the 
millennium crisis. It is not only interesting but 
also germane to the hypothesis that after the 
millennium, almost nothing of substance was 
published on Y2K. No scholarly monographs 
or articles were published. It was as though the 
Y2K crisis was a huge embarrassment, a trick 
that is best forgotten. The few Y2K failures 
did not have disastrous consequences, were 
speedily repaired, and were not reported at 
length. The long-term effects of Y2K on 
emergency response, back-up systems, 
auditing and oversight are discussed in a 
cursory fashion here and there, in engineering, 
retailing, healthcare, and information systems 
trade literature, but not in refereed articles (e.g., 
Elliott 2000; National Underwriter/Life and 
Health Financial Services Editorial 2000; 
Harrington 2000; Henderson 2000; Childress 
2004; Moran 2004). Significant material can 
be gathered and extrapolated on the surge in IT 
spending during the crisis in statistical 
abstracts or data from the Commerce 
Department. Finally, isolated comments and 
case studies, such as Nestle Struggles with 
Enterprise Systems (Laudon and Laudon 2003) 
tangentially document the deleterious impact 
of diverting funds needed for projects such as 
ERP development to the Y2K crisis. These and 
other small accounts in the aggregate offer 
important clues on the opportunity costs of 
Y2K funding. Three fine reports published in 
2000 document the collateral benefits of Y2K: 
the International Y2K Cooperation Center that 
was funded by the World Bank (International 
Y2K Cooperation Center 2000), Beckett’s 
Report to the House of Commons (Beckett 
2000), and Eleni Martin’s Silver Linings 
Report (Martin 2000).  This report notes that, 
after Y2K, governments were ideally 
positioned to take advantage of  more 
integrated and  responsive  systems. 
Except for the 9/11 Report (2004) by 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Against the United States, and Clarke’s 
Against All Enemies (Clarke 2004), definitive 
studies have not yet been conducted. Hulme, 
Garvey and Rendelman summarize the tension 
between government and business in their 
struggle to balance security and privacy 
concerns (Hulme, Garvey and Rendelman 
2002); Sobel’s report, Securing our 
Infrastructure (Sobel 2002), before the Senate 
Committee on Government Affairs also 
discusses this tension. Stephen Flynn criticizes 
the Bush Administration’s policies against 
terrorism before and after the 9/11 attacks in 
America the Vulnerable (Flynn 2004). A 
chapter by Warren and Hutchinson in 
Information Security Management: Global 
Challenges in the New Millennium surveys 
types of cyberterrorist attacks against ICTs, 
but not attacks on other targets using ICTs 
(Warren and Hutchinson 2001). Finally, 
Bonabeau and Meyer wrote a landmark article 
for the Harvard Business Review on swarm 
intelligence, forecasting the development of 
expert systems that recapture the collaborative 
intelligence of social insects; this is how the 
matrix model should work, and their research 
suggests that tools for improving group 
intelligence are forthcoming (Bonabeau and 
Meyer 2001).  
CONCLUSION: RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The thesis of this paper is that 
stakeholder participation and skillful 
articulation are both critical for EM post 9/11. 
The scope, depth, and ubiquity of both the 
Y2K problem and 9/11 challenges remain 
unprecedented. Both had the potential for 
grave damage to vast super systems, to the 
common good and public safety, but the 
public’s attention seldom wavered before Y2K, 
yet the public has yet to be engaged post 9/11 
 The author also addressed these 
questions: why did Y2K lack agency for the 
post 9/11 era, how could better balances be 
struck between a well-communicated 
campaign and a sensationalized event, and 
what benefits may be derived from successful 
EM outcomes? History never repeats itself, but 
it does resemble itself. It is doubtful that C.P. 
Snow’s assertion, that laymen are “tone deaf” 
in any debate about technology, is true. 
However, persuasive arguments require 
appropriate channels, rich messaging, and 
impressions management—the right melody, 
so to speak, to resonate and stimulate 
participation.  
Numerous additional research 
opportunities are embedded in Y2K and 9/11: 
impacts on employment, the infrastructure, 
political discourse, the erosion of trust, 
decision making, or legal systems. Can 
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patterns be discerned in the opportunity costs 
of EM funding, especially beyond IT? What 
are the consequences if resources are diverted 
for non-terrorist, emergent problems such as 
hactivists —politically-minded hackers who 
sabotage Websites and spread misinformation 
to manipulate public opinion?  
Which global players and partnerships 
were most impacted by Y2K and 9/11, and to 
what macro-economic effect? Also, in which 
industries or institutions was compliance, 
resistance, or upgrading most typical, and why? 
What was the precise impact of the billions of 
dollars spent on testing, debugging, and 
upgrading with Y2K or enhanced continuation 
after 9/11: on productivity and on the business 
cycle--in the short and in the long term? How 
much does disaster prevention channel an 
economy into new directions, or dead ends? 
Trends in IT investment from 1995 to 2000 
seem to show that heavy ICT investments 
contributed to a bubble in the stock market and 
eventual recession. 
EM after 9/11 is replete with research 
opportunities, such as collateral benefits and 
collateral damage due from campaigns against 
terrorism. What has not been done, and why, is 
significant in salient areas: improvements to 
the infrastructure, agreements on IT platforms, 
and massive ICT investments in strategic areas 
such as multi-sensory robots, increased 
broadband, data mining, biometrics, and 
artificial intelligence for language translation.  
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